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DETERMINATION OF CHILD CUSTODY: “SHARED 
CUSTODY V. JOINT CUSTODY” REFLECTED IN 
BROUSSARD V. ROGERS 
Aster Lee∗ 
 When a couple with children divorces, child custody and 
support become significant. If the couple does not reach consensus 
on those issues, they must bring them to a trial court to determine. 
The recent case of Broussard v. Rogers1 illustrates some of the 
difficulties that arise in making awards for child support. This case 
note will explore the standards considered by Louisiana trial courts 
when determining whether custody is “shared” or “joint”—a 
threshold question for the calculation of the amount of child 
support owed. This determination, it will be shown, properly 
focuses on the percentage of time spent by the children with each 
of their divorced parents.  
I. BACKGROUND  
 Ms. Broussard and Mr. Rogers married in 1997 and had 
their first child in 2000.2 In 2003, Ms. Broussard and Mr. Rogers 
entered into a joint custody agreement (“Agreement”) and were 
divorced thereafter.3 The contents of the Agreement were as 
follows: 1) The parties shared legal joint custody with alternating 
one week periods; 2) The agreement did not designate either party 
      ∗      J.D. & Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law, LSU Law Center, 2013. 
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 1.  Broussard v. Rogers, 54 So. 3d 826 (La. Ct. App. 5 Cir. 2011). 
 2.  Id. at 828. 
 3.  Id.  
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as a custodial parent; and 3) The agreement did not mention 
anything about the issue of child support.4 
 Approximately five and half years after the divorce, Ms. 
Broussard filed a Rule to Change Custody, requesting that the 
court change the custody status of her child because the previous 
agreement was no longer workable.5 Specifically, she requested 
that the court designate her as a custodial parent.6 Ms. Broussard 
also filed a Rule to Establish Child Support, requesting that the 
court award support based on her status as the custodial parent.7 
The trial court granted both motions.8 With respect to custody, the 
court allowed Mr. Rogers visitation every other weekend from the 
end of the school day on Friday until 6 p.m. on Sunday, plus every 
Tuesday and Thursday from the school day’s end until 8 p.m., plus 
two unnamed days per week with overnight visitation.9 Child 
support was awarded in the amount of $225.00 per month based 
upon the court’s determination that custody was “shared” under the 
meaning of Louisiana Revised Statutes [hereinafter L.R.S.] section 
9:315.9 and its application of the corresponding calculation 
schedule. Ms. Broussard appealed this decision, alleging that the 
trial court erred in calculating child support based on the argument 
that the trial court used the wrong schedule.  
II. DECISION OF THE COURT 
The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal in Broussard 
focused on the issue of whether the custody of the child was shared 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  This visitation schedule is reflected in the court’s interim judgment. Id. 
An interim judgment, or interlocutory judgment, is an intermediate judgment 
that determines a preliminary or subordinate point or plea but does not make a 
final determination in the case. A final judgment is a court's last action, which 
settles the rights of the parties and disposes of all issues in controversy, except 
for the award of costs (and, sometimes, attorney's fees) and enforcement of the 
judgment. Judgment, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 
 
                                                                                                             
2013] BROUSSARD V. ROGERS 279 
 
custody under the meaning of L.R.S. 9:315.9 or joint custody 
under L.R.S. 9:315.8.10 The Louisiana Revised Statutes provide 
differing methods for the calculation of child support depending 
upon whether custody is “joint” or “shared” as defined by law. 
According to L.R.S. 9:315.9, when custody is “shared,” each 
parent has physical custody of the child for an approximately equal 
amount of time.11 In cases of shared custody, Schedule B is utilized 
to calculate support.12 For all other “joint” custody arrangements in 
which custody is not “shared,” support is determined according to 
Schedule A. However, there is no statutory guideline to determine 
the issue of “an approximately equal amount of time.”13 Louisiana 
Revised Statute 9:315.9 does not bind the trial court to a threshold 
percentage determined solely on the number of days spent with the 
child.14 Instead, the trial court has discretion in determining 
whether a particular arrangement constitutes “shared custody,” 
justifying the application of L.R.S. 9:315.9.15  
 The trial court in Broussard held that the custody 
agreement between Ms. Broussard and Mr. Rogers, which 
provided Mr. Rogers every other weekend and 2 days a week 
visitation, constituted “shared custody.”16 On appeal, Ms. 
Broussard argued that the trial court erred on this point based on 
the calculation that Mr. Rogers had custody for only 42.85% of the 
 10.  Broussard, 54 So. 3d at 829. At first glance, the issue seems to be 
related to the child support issue rather than child custody (Ms. Broussard 
alleged that the trial court used the wrong schedule because the trial court used 
Schedule B (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9 (2012)) instead of Schedule A (LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.8 (2004)). However, the real issue is the type of child 
custody, because the court’s determination of which schedule to use ultimately 
depends on the determination of which type of child custody the court 
recognizes. (e.g., the court shall utilize Schedule A when the type of the child 
custody is shared custody under L.R.S. 9:315.8.). 
 11.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Broussard, 54 So. 3d at 829. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
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time, arguing that the Friday and Sunday visitations constituted 
one-half day each.17 
The Court acknowledged that there is no definition of a “day” 
for the purposes of custody in L.R.S. 9:315.8 and L.R.S. 9:315.9, 
but noted that L.R.S. 9:315.8(E)(2) provides that the court may 
determine what constitutes a day for the purposes of support, as 
long as it consists at least 4 hours.18 Although there is no statutory 
basis to allow a court to use L.R.S. 9:315.8(E)(2) in determining 
the meaning of a “day” for the purposes of support, the majority of 
the Court found that there is no provision to prohibit it, either.19  
Thus, based on its review of the trial court’s custody decree, 
the Court did not find any abuse of discretion in the trial court’s 
finding of shared custody.20 As long as the trial court’s ruling on 
the determination of shared custody was correct, the hearing 
officer’s use of Schedule B to calculate the child support was 
appropriate.  
III. COMMENTARY  
The Court’s decision in Broussard can only be evaluated in 
light of the history of Louisiana’s statutory scheme for child 
support. Prior to the 1989 enactment of uniform guidelines for 
determining child support awards, Louisiana, like many other 
states, conferred wide judicial discretion to a trial court to 
determine support on a case-by-case basis.21 In order to curtail 
potential divergent results among states and within a state due to 
the provided judicial discretion, Congress aimed at creating more 
uniform child support awards.22 As a result of this effort, Congress 
 17.  Id. at 829-830. 
 18.  However, the trial court did not state that it used L.R.S. 9:315.8(E)(2) 
in determining the custody. Id. at 830. 
 19.  Id. at 830. (Note, however, that in the dissent, Judge Rothschild pointed 
out that there is no provision to allow the trial court to use 9:315.8(E)(2) to 
determine what constitutes a day for the purposes of custody. Id. at 832.) 
 20.  Id. at 830. 
 21.  Guillot v. Munn, 756 So. 2d 290, 294 (La. 2000). 
 22.  Id. at 295. 
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enacted the Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, which 
required states to establish numeric guidelines to determine 
appropriate amounts of child support.23 However, the federal 
legislation did not require that the state guidelines be binding, and 
thus did not operate as a powerful enforcement mechanism for the 
state judiciary.24 Subsequently, Congress enacted the Family 
Support Act of 1988, mandating that states establish presumptive 
guidelines no later than October 13, 1989.25 In response to 1988 
legislation, the Louisiana legislature adopted presumptive 
guidelines to establish or modify child support.26 The purposes of 
the Louisiana’s guidelines were: (i) to address the inconsistency in 
the amounts of child support awards; and (ii) to solve the problem 
of inadequate amounts of child support awards.27  
Since the federal law mandated that the guidelines be 
presumptive, the presumption is rebuttable when the court finds the 
application of the guidelines to the circumstances unjust or 
inappropriate.28 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot explicitly 
provides a three-prong test for Louisiana trial courts if they are to 
deviate from the uniform guideline.29 First, the trial court must 
determine whether the visitation by the non-domiciliary parent is 
in fact extraordinary.30 If a non-domiciliary father visits merely a 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  2001 La. Acts No. 1082, §1.  
 27.  The underlying public policy as a foundation for the guidelines was the 
best interest of the child. But more specifically, Louisiana’s guidelines use an 
“income shares model” to determine and calculate the appropriate amount of 
child support. The “income shares model” is founded upon the tenet that the 
children should receive the same level of parental income that would have been 
provided to them as if their parents had lived together with them. Thus this 
approach focuses on the contribution by each parent in proportion to his or her 
resources. In other words, Louisiana has established its standard to determine 
the appropriate amount of support: the parent obligation to support their children 
is conjoint upon the economic capability of the parent. Stogner v. Stogner, 739 
So. 2d 762, 766 (La. 1999). 
 28.  Guillot v. Munn, 756 So. 2d at 296. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 299. 
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few days more than typical visitation under the guideline, it will 
usually not be considered extraordinary visitation warranting 
deviation.31 Second, the trial court must consider whether the extra 
time spent with the non-domiciliary parent causes him or her to 
bear a greater financial burden and consequently causes the 
domiciliary parent to bear a lesser financial burden.32 This 
consideration closely conforms to the Louisiana legislature’s intent 
in enacting L.R.S. 9:315.8.33 Last, it seems that the Louisiana 
Supreme Court wanted to provide a safe harbor by setting up 
minimum requirements for the trial court’s discretion.34 It requires 
the trial court to determine that the application of the guidelines in 
the particular circumstances under consideration would not be in 
the best interest of the child or would be inequitable to the parties, 
thus emphasizing fundamental policy and equity in child custody 
and support.35 The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot did not 
intend to draw a bright line as to what constitutes mathematical 
formula in determining shared custody, but it still warned the trial 
court to deviate “only to the extent not assumed in the statute.”36 
Subsequent to Guillot, the Louisiana legislature codified the 
requirements of Guillot in cases where physical custody of a non-
domiciliary parent reaches extraordinary levels; in other words, in 
cases of shared custody.37 The newly-enacted L.R.S. 9:315.9 
established the threshold percentage for shared custody at 49% for 
cases where the “approximately same amount of time” was spent 
with the non-domiciliary parent.38 
However, even when the children live with one parent for less 
than 49% of their time, the status of shared custody is not 
automatically denied. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 301. 
 37.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.8 (2001). 
 38.  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315.9, cmt.(a) (2012). 
 
 
                                                                                                             
2013] BROUSSARD V. ROGERS 283 
 
provided a long explanation about the circumstances in which the 
trial court may deviate from the amount of child support provided 
for by the guidelines. The Louisiana Supreme Court presumed that 
the intention of the legislative branch in enacting child custody and 
support laws was to achieve a consistent body of law.39 In most 
cases, it is in the child’s best interest to have regular contact with 
both parents and to split the custody equally between the parents.40 
Accordingly, the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished joint 
custody and shared custody: in a joint custody scheme, a 
domiciliary parent shares most of the time with the children, but he 
or she should allow a typical amount of visitation based on the 
guidelines conferred by statutes; and in a shared custody scheme, 
the non-domiciliary parent spends a non-typical, or extraordinary, 
amount of time with the children so that the amount reaches the 
heightened level required by statute. On this point—of determining 
whether the non-domiciliary parent spends as much time as the 
domiciliary parent with the child—the trial court is offered ample 
discretion to deviate from the guideline’s threshold percentage. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Guillot confirmed this wide 
discretion allowed to the trial court in such circumstances as 
consistent with legislative intent.41  
Since Guillot and the promulgation of L.R.S. 9:315.9, courts 
have wrestled with the threshold percentage and its exceptions, as 
applied for characterizing custody as shared or joint.42 For 
example, in Lea v. Sanders, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals found that L.R.S. 9.319.9 requires 50%–50% (same) or 
49%–51% (approximately same) as the “threshold” percentage for 
shared custody.43 The Lea court held that 43% was insufficient to 
 39.  Guillot v. Mund, 756 So. 2d at 298. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 300. 
 42.  Robert C. Lowe. Steps for calculating total support obligation—Shared 
custody arrangement and child support under 2001, 2002, and 2003 legislation, 
in 1 LA. PRAC. DIVORCE § 8:47 (West 2012 ed.) 
 43.  Id. (citing Lea v. Sanders, 890 So. 2d 764 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2004)). 
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establish shared custody.44 However, in the year following the Lea 
decision, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a 
45.5%–54.5% sharing was sufficient to trigger Schedule B, which 
was to be utilized for a shared custody situation.45 There has not 
been a Supreme Court case after Guillot on this issue. In Janney, 
the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals held that 45.3% of the 
year was sufficient for shared custody, and this is the lowest 
percentile for the recognition of shared custody before 
Broussard.46  
In Broussard vs. Rogers, Ms. Broussard calculated that Mr. 
Rogers had custody for 42.85% of the time.47 This percentile was 
far higher than the 37% which the Louisiana Supreme Court in 
Guillot declined to categorize as shared custody, but still lower 
than any Louisiana case acknowledging shared custody status. 
Broussard v. Rogers thus expands the limitations of the shared 
custody designation beyond the existing jurisprudence.  
The majority’s justification for this rests on a calculation of 
days spent by the child with Mr. Rogers based on L.R.S. 
9:315.8(E)(2), which states that a day consists of at least 4 hours 
for the purposes of support. As the dissent pointed out, there is no 
legal support for the use of such a calculation—which was 
supposed to be utilized in determining child support—to be used in 
order to determine child custody.48 The dissenting opinion in 
Broussard has some legal merits since there is no statutory basis 
for the trial court in Broussard to find that a “day” consists of 4 or 
more hours for the purposes of custody. However, the majority’s 
position, in a practical sense, provides a uniform measurement for 
the counting of a “day” for both child custody and child support. If 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. (citing DeSoto v. DeSoto, 893 So. 2d 175 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 
2005)). 
 46.  Id. (citing Janney v. Janney, 943 So. 2d 396 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 
2005)). 
 47.  54 So. 3d at 830-31. 
 48.  Id. at 832. 
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there are two different methods of counting a “day” for custody 
and support, there would be less legal consistency between them 
and it might lead to a myriad of redundant arguments by attorneys 
who attempt to count a “day” in the manner most advantageous to 
their clients. In addition, the legislative intent is to provide wide 
discretion to trial courts, so long as this does not severely erode the 
uniformity of the guidelines conferred by the statutes. Generally, 
the trial court is the best place to balance several pertinent factors 
in determining whether, and how much, to deviate from the 
guidelines, especially on the issue of measuring the time spent by 
each parent with the child. As a result, this case is a good example 
to show that a case-by-case approach provides better flexibility for 
courts to find the most appropriate ways to achieve the best interest 
of the child.  
 
 
 
